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Breaking Free: Dag Hammarskjöld, Good Offices and Heads of 
International Organisations  
Aoife O’Donoghue  
1. Introduction 
Besides being highly influential in establishing the role of heads of international 
organisations within international law, Dag Hammarskjöld’s endeavours significantly altered 
the office of UN Secretary-General. In contemporary international law heads of international 
organisations hold important positions. Dag Hammarskjöld’s affect on the office of UN 
Secretary-General and, more particularly, on the good offices role of heads of international 
organisations is arguably unparalleled. His impact was partly a consequence of the 
groundwork, at both the UN and League of Nations, of previous holders of the office of 
Secretary-General. Indeed Tryge Lie can be greatly credited for developing the office of UN 
Secretary-General. Nonetheless, these officeholders did not instigate the transformation 
achieved be Dag Hammarskjöld.
1
 He went beyond merely carrying out the office of 
Secretary-General, he understood what the office could conceivably become if developed 
correctly and, as such, greatly expanded its remit, establishing what is recognised as the 
contemporary role of heads of international organisations.  
Dag Hammarskjöld’s impact is so potent that the role now played by heads of international 
organisations and, particularly the UN Secretary-General, in the contemporary international 
legal order would have been inconceivable before he entered office.
2
 Dag Hammarskjöld 
advanced the independent voice of heads of international organisations and the key role they 
play in conflict management and resolution. This article focuses on the UN Secretary-General 
and more particularly, the role played by Dag Hammarskjöld in developing good offices. The 
purpose of this article is to consider Dag Hammarskjöld’s impact upon the role of UN 
Secretary-General and good offices. This will be realised through an examination of both his 
and the Secretaries-General who followed, good offices.  
Holding unique positions in international law enables the heads of international organisations 
to engage with conflict, post-conflict and transitional states differently to other international 
actors. Strictly, as heads of secretariats, they are first bound by the internal rules of their 
organisations, second by international institutional law and third by general international 
law.
3
 Yet, these legal parameters stop somewhat short of articulating the full extent of the 
role which certain heads of international organisations, particularly UN Secretaries-General, 
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have carved for themselves. Dag Hammarskjöld, in moving beyond the strict limits of the 
Charter and the role played by his predecessors at the UN and the League of Nations set the 
tone for future UN Secretaries-General and arguably other heads of international 
organisations. A UN Secretary-General may now intervene in a conflict on a number of basis; 
on a UN mandate, on his own initiative independent of a mandate or, alternatively, at the 
request of parties. In each of these cases, the Secretary-General will either decide the form 
and structure of the conflict management or will be highly influential in its establishment and 
design. This is far beyond what was first envisaged for the UN Secretary-General.
4
 Dag 
Hammarskjöld enabled the office of UN Secretary-General to break free from the other 
organs of the UN and strengthened the independent role of the office.  
Despite good offices' rather nebulous legal underpinnings, beginning with the establishment 
of the UN, contemporary good offices has emerged as one of the foremost forms of pacific 
settlement. Generally speaking, contemporary good offices consists of the heads of 
international organisations using their position to undertake a range of dispute management 
practices. While good offices may be undertaken by states and other international actors, 
since the establishment of the UN the heads of international organisations have become far 
more active in this field. This article considers how much this is the result of Dag 
Hammarskjöld's actions. This examination requires an analysis of the legal structure of good 
offices and the UN, as well as the practice that Dag Hammarskjöld and other Secretaries-
General instituted.  
Ultimately, this piece assesses how much Dag Hammarskjöld can claim credit for the 
present-day operation of good offices and further, what attribution should be given to him in 
understanding the present roles of heads of international organisations. In asking these 
questions several other issues are also considered. For example, what were the legal 
structures for good offices that Dag Hammarskjöld worked within, how these were 
transformed by practice during his time in office and how much of this change has formed 
part of contemporary practice. Further, what insights may be garnered from the development 
of good offices, in relation to contemporary dispute settlement and, more importantly, the 
role of heads of international organisations as international actors? This article seeks to 
understand what elements of the changes brought about by Dag Hammarskjöld’s remain 
relevant today. 
2. What are good offices? 
Good offices possesses no international legal definition. Rather a multitude of various treaty 
definitions, General Assembly resolutions, and other documents set out its broad parameters. 
As one of the many methods available for the pacific settlement of disputes, good offices 
emerges as a practice largely associated with the heads of international organisations, 
particularly the UN Secretary-General.
5
  Indeed, it is the practice of UN Secretaries-General 
                                                          
4
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which is the best guide to good office’s operation in the 21st Century. UN Secretary-General 
Javier Pèrez de Cuéllar argued that good offices is a form of ‘quiet diplomacy’ and, as such, 
developing a legal analysis is made more difficult by the lack of documentation and muted 
terms of its operation.
6
 The legal literature and analysis is also somewhat sparse.  
Generally, good offices is a form of dispute settlement which maintains numerous techniques 
for resolution and is capable of evolving alongside a dispute. As such, its exact content is less 
important than its reliance on the office undertaking the role together with its ability to evolve 
with the conflict.
7
 The importance of the office and personality undertaking good offices is 
evident in its description. An office holder undertakes “her” good offices, this subjectivity 
ties the process to the person holding the office, a point which will be returned to in the 
context of Dag Hammarskjöld.  
Good offices developed from a narrow, state-led form of diplomacy to incorporating a broad 
range of pacific settlement activities. One of the key features of its evolution has been the 
transition from state-based to non-state actors being the prime drivers of its operation.
8
 Good 
offices includes; facilitating talks or other procedural obligations, active participation in 
negotiating, implementing, adjudicating and supervising peace agreements as well as 
settlements involving humanitarian and human rights law in addition to mediation or 
conciliation.
9
 Good offices transforms alongside the conflict; as it descends into violence, 
during the conflict and afterward as a method of preventing and ending the violence as well 
as reconstructing peace including monitoring both ceasefires and peace agreements. Thus, 
good offices changes as circumstances require. 
Historically, various international and regional treaties include a rather narrow interpretation 
of good offices. The 1899/1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes defines good offices under article 2 ‘[i]n case of disagreement or dispute, before an 
appeal to arms, the Contracting Parties agree to have recourse as far as circumstances allow 
to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers.’10 This conception of good 
offices separates the process of mediation and identifies it closely with conciliation. 
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Arguably, while maintaining a distinctive form, good offices includes both mediation and 
conciliation as well as other forms of dispute settlement activities.  
Under Article 3 of the 1899/1907 Convention powers that are ‘strangers to the dispute’ 
should offer their good offices on their own initiative.
11
 This established a right of initiative 
as part of the practice of good offices. The significance of this right of initiative became 
evident as multilateralism evolved in the post-Charter era, particularly as, from the outset, 
UN Secretaries-General became involved in situations without specific mandates or 
invitations. Article 6 the 1899/1907 Convention states that good offices has ‘exclusively the 
character of advice and never has…binding force.’12 This non-binding character remains 
unless the parties agree otherwise or the Secretary-General is acting under a Chapter VII 
Security Council resolution. 
Various heads of international organisations employ good offices, particularly and most 
comparable to the UN, the Commonwealth Secretary-General and the Director General of the 
WTO. The Commonwealth increasingly engages in good offices, The Millbrook 
Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration 1995, The Harare 
Commonwealth Declaration, 1991 and the Coolum Declaration all set good offices as a 
priority for the Commonwealth Secretary-General.
13
  
Under the dispute settlement process within the WTO, its Director General has a good offices 
role. Article 5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states that ‘[g]ood offices, 
conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the parties to the 
dispute so agree’. Under Article 5.6 the ‘[t]he Director-General may, acting in an ex officio 
capacity, offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting Members to 
settle a dispute.’14 While arguably, the UN Secretaries-General's good offices remains the 
most developed, the role played by both these heads of organisation suggests that good 
offices is now more widely regarded as part of responsibilities of heads of certain 
international organisations. 
3. UN Good Offices 
The In Larger Freedom Report acknowledges the importance of  
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‘using the Secretary-General’s Good Offices to help resolve conflicts…but we could 
undoubtedly save many more lives…I urge Member States to allocate additional 
resources to the Secretary-General for his good offices function.’15  
The UN Secretary-General’s good offices grew out of the Charter’s legal structure. Article 
2(4) together with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter set the basic parameters under which 
pacific dispute settlement occurs. These articles are the springboards from which good offices 
emerged, though to fully understand its legal position, it is necessary to move beyond the 
Charter.
16
 For example, article 99 states that ‘the Secretary-General may bring to the attention 
of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’17 This article enables a Secretary-General to independently 
assess whether a threat to international peace and security exists.
18
 Good offices goes 
unmentioned in the Charter and therefore, it is the resolutions of the General Assembly and 
Security Council coupled with practice that requires consideration.
19
  
The UN Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes defines good offices as when  
'[s]tates party to a dispute are unable to settle it directly, a third party, may offer his 
[or her] good offices as a means of preventing further deterioration of the dispute and 
as a method of facilitating efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute.’20  
Further it states that, ‘[t]he third party exercising good offices normally seeks to encourage 
the parties to the dispute to resume negotiations, thus providing them with a channel of 
communication.’21 This is a basic outline of what good offices encapsulates within the UN 
structure albeit it not mention involvement beyond facilitation or encouragement, it does not 
exclude these possibilities either.  
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 Chapter XV of the Charter sets out the functions of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General, this 
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19
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 December 
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(15
th
 November 1982). 
20
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OLA/COD/2394, para 101. 
21
 Ibid., at para 102. 
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The General Assembly Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States 
affirms that the 'Secretary-General should make full use of the provisions of the Charter.'
22
 
General Assembly Resolution 43/51 also examined the good offices of the Secretary-General, 
stating that the, 'Secretary-General if approached by a State or States directly concerned with 
a dispute or situation should respond swiftly by urging the States to seek a solution…and by 
offering his good offices.'
23
 It goes on to say that, 'The Secretary-General should…consider 
making full use of fact finding capabilities.'
24
 These resolutions were followed in 1995 and 
2003 by resolutions reaffirming the role.
25
 The Security Council, meeting for the first time at 
head of state level, also requested that the Secretary-General continue to make use of good 
offices.
26
  
Together with more specific mandates these resolutions establish the legal and political basis 
for good offices within the UN. In combination these put beyond dispute that good offices 
forms part of the Secretary-General’s function. Thus, it is the parameters of action which are 
open to discussion and not good offices’ legitimacy. Both the Security Council and General 
Assembly have utilised good offices on many occasions, some of which are explored in the 
next section. The Charter, resolutions and specific mandates of the Security Council and 
General Assembly are integral to understanding the good offices role which Secretaries-
General carved for themselves. 
3.1. Security Council Mandates  
Article 98 is the basis on which the Security Council uses the Secretary-General's good 
offices. Under this article the Security Council can ask the Secretary-General to carry out any 
activities that it considers necessary. Chapters VI and VII outline the Security Council’s role 
in maintaining international peace and security and enables it to mandate the Secretary-
General to take steps necessary to carry out this function. While actions taken under Chapter 
VII provides a Secretary-General with particularly strong legal foundations, the 
manoeuvrability and independence of the Secretary-General in carrying out the role must also 
be carefully maintained.  
In 1946 the Security Council first used the Secretary-General’s good offices. The conflict 
centred on the presence of Soviet troops in occupation of the Northern Azeri region of Iran. 
Trygve Lie, already involved on his own initiative, was asked by the Security Council, in the 
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 General Assembly Resolutions 37/10 The Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between 
States, 15
th
 November 1982.Part II 6, it also states in Part I, 5 that “States shall seek in good faith…settlement of 
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23
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Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field. 5
th
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24
 Ibid., at part 22. 
25
 General Assembly Resolution 50/50 United Nations Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between 
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26
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absence of the USSR, to have all parties report to him on troop withdrawal.
27
 In the same 
year, the Security Council asked Trygve Lie, again already engaged on his own initiative, to 
be involved in the Commission to settle a dispute on the northern Greek frontier between 
Greece and Yugoslavia.
28
 These two incidences show the Security Council’s early confidence 
in both the office of the Secretary-General and Trygve Lie as incumbent.  
The Security Council asked Trygve Lie to report on events in Korea.
29
 These reports are key 
to understanding the developing character of good offices as Trygve Lie used the opportunity 
to make a statement on his own understanding of events as opposed to an impartial account. 
Franck argues that, with particular regard to Security Council mandates, such reports enable a 
Secretary-General to separate himself from both the disputants and the Security Council.
30 
In 
doing so, Trygve Lie laid the foundations for the actions subsequently taken by Dag 
Hammarskjöld. 
3.2. General Assembly Mandates 
Unlike the Security Council, on very few occasions has the General Assembly asked the 
Secretary-General to become involved in a specific conflict. Rather, the General Assembly 
has been prolific in re-affirming the importance of the Secretary-General's good offices as a 
key aspect of the pacific settlement of disputes.
31
 In 1950 the General Assembly established 
the Permanent Commission for Good Offices but this initiative was not followed by any 
concerted efforts to actually engage in the practice.
32
 Despite the ability to give the Secretary-
General whatever instruction it wishes, and the adoption of the 1950 United for Peace 
Resolution, the General Assembly was slow to give a specific mandate.
33
 Trygve Lie was 
only set administrative tasks within dispute settlement missions rather than any separate 
mandate for active involvement in dispute resolution.  
This lack of General Assembly activity can be explained by the more pro-active role the 
Security Council was, at that time, undertaking. The Peking Formula, an initiative of Dag 
Hammarskjöld’s explored below, is indelibly linked to the differences between Security 
Council and General Assembly mandates. The role of Chapter VII and its binding character 
differentiates the mandates of both organs and, as such, changes the relationship both have 
with the Secretary-General. Nonetheless, prior to Dag Hammarskjöld taking office, the 
General Assembly had not actively engaged the Secretary-General as a purveyor of good 
offices.  
                                                          
27
 SC Resolution 2, The Iranian Question, 30
th
 January 1946. 
28
 SC Resolution 15, The Greek Question, 19
th
 December 1946. 
29
 Gordenker, supra note 5, at 144. 
30
 Franck, supra note 5, at 384, Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council since 1994 are 
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rd 
February 2003. 
32
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33
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rd
 November 1950. 
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3.3. On the Initiative of the Secretary-General  
The Secretary-General, no matter who has held office, has always acted on his own initiative. 
The description of early Security Council mandates in the previous section, where Trygve Lie 
had, in fact, already become involved are good examples of such activity. Trygve Lie’s 
involvement in the Iranian question was one of the first such activities, unequivocally laying 
claim to the Secretary-General’s ability to inquire into situations on his own initiative. The 
basis on which the Secretary-General becomes involved in negotiations is probably most 
closely linked to article 99. To assess whether there is a threat to international peace and 
security the Secretary-General will, at the very least, have to investigate the circumstances. 
The ability of the Secretary-General to use article 99 in circumstances where he felt there was 
a threat to international peace and security, aided in the development of autonomous 
initiatives and underpins the necessity to carry out the role as prescribed by the article though 
it has been sparingly applied. 
During the Korean conflict, Trygve Lie took a very public position. Luard suggests that ‘[i]t 
is arguable that he might have done better to leave the initiative more strictly in the hands of 
the Council and have acted... on the basis of instructions he received from the political 
bodies.’34 Trygve Lie came under attack from the Soviet Union for his actions and, as a 
result, they refused to back him for another term in office. The USA resolved to veto any 
candidate other than Trygve Lie and, in the end, a General Assembly resolution extended 
Lie’s term of office. 35 Thereafter, the Soviets ‘consistently boycotted Trygve Lie on every 
occasion when he appeared.’36 Nationalist China also refused to back Lie due to his support 
for Communist China's representation at the UN. Thus Trygve Lie’s ability to carry on good 
offices was radically reduced and eventually his position being untenable, hastening his 
retirement.  
From these early episodes what is clear is that the Secretary-General was not free to voice an 
unrequested opinion or become involved in a situation without being first solicited to do so or 
least being ratified after he had become involved. If not, the wrath of certain members was 
sufficient as to stop the Secretary-General from carrying out his office. From this basic 
outline of the circumstances in which Dag Hammarskjöld took over the role of Secretary-
General and good offices, it is possible to examine the consequences of his term in office. 
4. Dag Hammarskjöld and Good Offices  
This section examines the good offices undertaken by Dag Hammarskjöld while UN 
Secretary-General. Two key events: Congo and Peking Hostages, are examined as essential 
examples of the changes brought about by Dag Hammarskjöld. The development of what was 
known as 'leave it to Dag' is also considered as an important feature of Dag Hammarskjöld's 
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influence both on the role of Secretary-General and the use of the good offices.
 37
 'Leave it to 
Dag' also highlights how much of the role of Secretary-General and good offices is linked to 
the personality holding the office.  
'Leave it to Dag' emerged during the Suez crisis of 1956. Dag Hammarskjöld had already, 
before the UN asked for his involvement, held consultations in Israel and Egypt during the 
build up to the Suez Crises. Subsequently, under instructions from the Security Council, Dag 
Hammarskjöld became embroiled in the conflict.
38
 Suez is a good example of a Security 
Council mandate during Dag Hammarskjöld's time in office. The resolution required Dag 
Hammarskjöld to report on compliance with the armistice agreement and further to ensure its 
effectiveness. Dag Hammarskjöld played a central role in relaxing the tensions between the 
parties and indeed the parties were quite positive about his involvement.
39
  
After the initial crisis had passed Dag Hammarskjöld continued as a guarantor of the 
settlement, most probably extending the role beyond what the Security Council mandated, 
however as Higgins points out, most of these resolutions tend to be vague in their exact 
parameters.
40
 Dag Hammarskjöld's success in the Suez led directly to the ‘leave it to Dag’ 
approach within the Security Council and established both Dag Hammarskjöld and the office 
of Secretary-General at the centre of pacific settlement of disputes, though how much this 
relied on Dag Hammarskjöld's personality is unquantifiable.  
While it was in Suez that the confidence of UN members in Dag Hammarskjöld was 
established it was in both Congo and in establishing the Peking formula that Dag 
Hammarskjöld pushed the basis for Secretary-General action. Both of these events moved 
authorisation for good offices beyond the membership and politics and put the office of 
Secretary-General forward as an independent office, an international actor based within the 
Charter with guidance from UN organs as a secondary basis of action.  
4.1. Congo 
The conflict in Congo was a test for the UN and an indicator of the type of conflicts which 
would become central to its work. Congo was particularly important for Dag Hammarskjöld 
as he grappled with both conflicting parties within the country but also the wider interests 
pushing for various outcomes. Congo came to dominate his final years in office. Gordenker 
argues that ‘nothing had more novelty than the role of the Secretary-General in organising 
and directing the deployment of armed battalions.’41 Indeed, Congo was a watershed for both 
the UN and the office of Secretary-General.  
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38
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Prior to the initial Security Council mandate, Dag Hammerskjöld used article 99 to propose 
the deployment of peacekeepers in Congo.
42
 The Security Council granted Dag 
Hammarskjöld an extremely wide and somewhat vague mandate enabling him to take an 
extensive range of actions.
43
 Dag Hammarskjöld took a very hands-on approach which has 
not been replicated since. The wide-remit granted by the Security Council mandate allowed 
Dag Hammarskjöld to react to changing events on the ground and to make decisions 
quickly.
44
 The unfolding events in Congo are discussed in depth elsewhere and, as such, this 
paper will only linger upon its impact on good offices.  
In describing his decision-making process Dag Hammarskjöld outlined the legal hierarchy 
which a Secretary-General should follow in settling upon a plan of action. First follow, ‘the 
principles and purposes of the Charter which are fundamental law and accepted by and 
binding on all States.’45 Second consider ‘the body of legal doctrine and precepts that have 
been accepted by States generally and particularly as manifested in the resolutions of UN 
organs’.46 Dag Hammarskjöld places the Charter and not the mandate given by members, 
either through Security Council or General Assembly, as the first basis of his authority. This 
is significant in establishing the independence of the office of Secretary-General and the role 
maintained through good offices. 
Dag Hammarskjöld argued that Member States, in signing the Charter, were binding 
themselves, on all occasions, to follow its precepts.
47
 The hierarchy established under article 
103 of the Charter extends to the entire international legal order. Customary international 
law, treaty law and other secondary sources of authority complete and sustain the Charter but 
do not compete for power. This established a binding line of authority which places the 
Charter at its apex followed by the Security Council as the organ with binding authority. Yet, 
even Security Council resolutions must be in compliance with the precepts of the Charter. 
Kofi Annan argued, confirming Dag Hammerskjöld's chain of authority, that, ‘[a] Secretary-
General must be judged by his fidelity to the principles of the Charter.’48 
Importantly, for good offices, this line of authority establishes the independence of the UN 
Secretary-General as separate from other UN organs. According to Dag Hammerskjöld when 
a Secretary-General is following a Security Council mandate under article 98 both the spirit 
of the mandate and the Charter, with the Charter as pre-eminent, must be kept in mind. Yet, if 
a Secretary-General judged a Security Council mandate to be outside the principles of the 
Charter it is not clear what options might be open to him, particularly as there is no judicial 
review or other similar process within the UN. 
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Dag Hammarskjöld’s involvement in Congo led him to an impasse with the Soviet Union 
similar to what Trygve Lie had experienced concerning Korea. While, unlike Trygve Lie, he 
was appointed for a second term by the Security Council, the Soviet Union instigated a 
sustained plan to remove him from office, and to contemporaneously greatly reduce the 
power of the Secretary-General.  
Chairman Khrushchev stated that the;  
‘[a]ssembly should call Mr Hammerskjöld to order, ensure that he does not misuse the 
position of the Secretary-General; but carries out his functions in strict accordance 
with the provisions of the UN Charter and the decisions of the Security Council.’49  
This mirrors comments made in 2004 by the Greek Cypriot leaders regarding Kofi Annan.
50
 
When a Secretary-General acts in a manner which dissatisfies some members, there is still 
criticism, however, following Dag Hammarskjöld, such censure is not paralysing. The Soviet 
Union boycotted Dag Hammarskjöld and proposed a troika office of Secretary-General.
51
 
This plan never obtained enough support to become a serious option as the political 
hyperbole that underlined both the criticism and the troika proposal was evident. The impact 
upon the development of good offices of the Soviet Union's campaign is unclear as it was cut 
short by Dag Hammarskjöld’s death. If a troika position had been created, it is possible that 
growth may have been stunted as the independence behind good offices would be reduced 
and possibly good offices may have altogether ceased. 
4.2. The Peking Formula  
Dag Hammarskjöld's establishment of the Peking Formula was key in furthering the 
independence of the office of Secretary-General and developing good offices as one of its 
most important functions. Fundamentally, the ‘Peking Formula’ enables the Secretary-
General to adjust a General Assembly mandate to make possible his completion of a good 
offices mission. If a Secretary-General receives a mandate from the General Assembly to 
conduct negotiations and the mandate is either restrictive or criticises one or more of the 
parties, the Secretary-General modifies the mandate to accommodate negotiations.  
The Peking Formula was established in 1954 when Dag Hammarskjöld was given a mandate 
by the General Assembly to negotiate the release of US Aircrew Hostages held in the 
People’s Republic of China which, at that time, remained unrepresented at the UN as 
Nationalist China held the seat. This last detail added to the complications in undertaking the 
mission. However, the biggest hindrance to resolving the situation proved to be the General 
Assembly's resolution.
52
 In its outright condemnation of the Government of the People's 
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Republic of China for detaining the aircrew, the resolution made it highly unlikely that they 
would agree to negotiate for the release of the hostages under its terms.  
Dag Hammerskjöld found the resolution too partisan to allow for successful dialogue. To 
reach a deal with the Government of the People’s Republic of China, he disengaged the 
negotiations from the very General Assembly resolution that granted his mandate. Dag 
Hammerskjöld assured the Government of the People's Republic that their acceptance of his 
good offices did not imply acceptance of the UN General Assembly's censure. In 
disassociating himself from the resolution and taking an impartial stance he fell somewhere 
between a specific mandate to act and an independent initiative.  
The innovation of the Peking Formula should not be underestimated. The use by the General 
Assembly of good offices while contemporaneously accepting impartial political and 
diplomatic activity on the part of the Secretary-General was essential in developing the 
autonomy of the Secretary-General and of good offices. It is what Hammarskjöld described 
as having, ‘led to the acceptance of an independent political and diplomatic activity on the 
part of the Secretary-General as the neutral representative of the Organisation.’53 This 
growing independence was sustained and transformed by Dag Hammarskjöld while he was in 
office and continued by his successors. 
Importantly, the Peking Formula is indelibly linked to a General Assembly and not a Security 
Council mandate thus indicating that while the Secretary-General can deviate from a mandate 
established by the General Assembly this is less likely with a Security Council resolution. 
The authority sanctioning both organs' use of the Secretary-General comes from the same 
article of the Charter and this may prima facie imply that the ability to digress from a strict 
reading of a mandate should be cognate. Nonetheless, reading the Charter as a whole, the 
Chapter VII authority of the Security Council to bind members in matters of international 
peace and security must also be considered.
54
 This supremacy appears to be the reason for the 
Secretary-General’s stricter interpretation of Security Council resolutions, even when not 
adopted under Chapter VII, as opposed to the liberal interpretations of General Assembly 
resolutions. However, the above discussion of Dag Hammarskjöld's own view of the line of 
authority should also be kept in mind in considering the Peking Formula. 
5. After Dag Hammarskjöld 
Discussing the legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld, Kofi Annan stated that, ‘I suspect he would 
envy me the discretion I enjoy in deciding what to say and what topics to comment on.’55 
Kofi Annan regarded himself, the seventh Secretary-General, as having much more discretion 
and independence than Dag Hammarskjöld. To fully understand the impact which Dag 
Hammarskjöld had on good offices and the office of Secretary-General a brief overview of 
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the activities of the Secretaries-General who followed him is necessary. This section will 
outline how good offices developed after Dag Hammarskjöld's death. 
Since U Thant's engagement in the dispute in 1964, Cyprus has been a re-occurring fixture of 
Secretaries'-General good offices which continues to be beyond resolution.
56
 Following the 
Turkish invasion of 1974, Kurt Waldheim established a framework for negotiation,
57
 
however, as with every case since, subsequent talks stalled.
58
 Boutros Boutros Ghali held 
intensive negotiations 1993.
59
 This effort was welcomed by the Security Council but, again, 
was unsuccessful.
60
 Kofi Annan, in his efforts to resolve the dispute, moved far beyond the 
traditional role of good offices to actually composing, instead of mediating, a settlement that 
became known as the Annan Plan. Under the Plan if parties failed to negotiate a settlement it 
was agreed to put to a resolution composed by the Secretary-General to the people by 
referendum.
 61
 Ultimately, the plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriot community.
62
 In the 
aftermath of the failed plan Kofi Annan decided that he had accomplished all he could at that 
time.
63
 Negotiations have once again commenced under the current Secretary-General.
64
 
From a good offices perspective what is important is the vast independence that Kofi Annan 
had in devising a resolution which was directed at individuals and not their representatives. 
For the first time, there was a direct line between individuals and the office of Secretary-
General. This appears to be the furthest that Security Council mandated good offices have 
been extended. While in the Congo, Dag Hammerskjöld had the power to conduct battles on 
the ground, he did not have the authority to bypass the political representatives and go 
directly to the people. The Cypriot Security Council resolutions tend to be imprecise and no 
member of the Security Council has criticised a Secretary-General's actions in Cyprus, which 
suggests their acquiescence to his wider activities. This exemplifies just how much the role 
has grown and the trust parties and the Security Council now have in the Secretaries'-General 
good offices, even if some parties to the dispute have themselves criticised the Annan Plan 
and subsequent negotiations have yet to bear fruit.
65
  
The Security Council continues to rely on good offices. Its use has ebbed and flowed, for 
example in the aftermath of the Cold War the Security Council's invocation of good offices 
diminished. Nonetheless, what is evident is how much the Security Council value good 
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offices as a significant aspect of the Secretary-General's role.
66
 In this short space, every 
Security Council mandate cannot be discussed, however, the continued use and support for 
good offices is apparent. In 1946, they were the first UN organ to entrust the Secretary-
General with good offices. Although this is not surprising given the Security Council role in 
the maintenance of international peace and security, it suggests an immediate recognition of 
its importance. The Security Council allows much latitude in these mandates. While 
occasionally there has been criticism, the role which Dag Hammerskjöld established allows 
for much independence. The Security Council readily relies on good offices and their lead 
gave credence to the mandates which have followed from other UN organs. 
The General Assembly continues to employ the Secretary-General's good offices. For 
example, over several years the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General’s 
involvement in Cambodia.
67
 In addition, variations on the Peking Formula continue, for 
example, Javier Pèrez de Cuéllar in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Soviet Union's veto in the 
Security Council left it to the General Assembly to mandate the Secretary-General 
negotiations.
68
 Over the following years the Secretary-General was heavily involved. The 
General Assembly's resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, an 
objectionable proposition to both the Soviet Union and the Afghan Government it 
supported.
69
 To conduct negotiations the Secretary-General employed the Peking Formula.
70
 
Urquhart described the Secretary-General’s involvement as ‘offer [ing] a compelling example 
of an exceedingly difficult and long step by step process of UN conflict resolution in a 
situation in which others could not or did not wish to act’.71  
Of late, the General Assembly has taken a backseat in good offices as the Security Council 
takes the lead in international peace and security. Though, as mentioned above, the General 
Assembly has continued to support the notion of good offices in the guise of broader 
resolutions on dispute settlement within the UN.  
The Secretary-General continues to act on his own initiative. In 1962, a Yemenite coup d’etat 
and the involvement of foreign forces supporting both sides of the conflict caused an 
escalation in violence within the country. Thant negotiated for the dispatch of UN forces to 
supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces. Subsequently, he reported his activities to the 
Security Council which did not debate the Report, suggesting their tacit agreement to the 
Secretary-General acting on his own initiative.
72
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U Thant’s involvement in Vietnam illustrates the pressure a Secretary-General can bring to 
bear upon members of the UN. Originally, U Thant expressed a wish to only hold one term of 
office, however ‘when he made public his reluctance, the expressions of support and 
confidence which his reluctance had elicited demonstrated that he too now had considerable 
capacity to make demands.’73 He chose to claim a wider UN role in Vietnam, While such a 
demand was not popular with the US and he had little success, unlike his immediate 
predecessor he did not fall out with a major power to such a degree that his tenure became 
impractical, underscoring the growing independence of the office. 
Kurt Waldheim was less sure of the Secretary-General's ability to act and stated, following an 
unsuccessful involvement in the 1980 American hostage situation in Iran, that the ‘simple 
truth’ was that the Secretary-General ‘has no executive power.’74 This pronouncement despite 
the fact that during an earlier hostage situation in Algeria, Kurt Waldheim neither sought nor 
received any mandate and successfully negotiated the release of hostages. This incidence also 
demonstrates that states are willing to respond to such activities by a Secretary General.
75
 
In 1983, Javier Pèrez de Cuéllar with the Secretary-General of the OAS and the Contadora 
Group settled various conflicts in Central and South America.
76
 Their efforts resulted in the 
Arias plan, the Esquipalas Accords I and II and the Declaration of Costa del Sol.
77
 His 
personal involvement in settling the Central American issue was pivotal and without his 
intense motivation, it is doubtful that such success would have been achieved.
78
 The fact that 
the majority of the activities undertaken were outside a Security Council or General 
Assembly mandate helps to cement the independent good offices role, especially when it 
resulted in a successful resolution.  
In 1991, Javier Pèrez de Cuéllar involved himself in the hostage situation in the Lebanon. 
After several fruitless efforts by other mediators to liberate the hostages, Javier Pèrez de 
Cuéllar secured their release.
79
 He stated that ‘I have been working I don’t know how many 
years, working quietly in order to obtain the release of all the hostages’.80 This is illustrates 
the low-key manner in which good offices are performed. He eventually secured the release 
of all the hostages in the Lebanon; this is especially significant given the difficult on-going 
power struggles in the area. 
A more recent development has been the use of good offices outside the realm of the UN. A 
request by parties to a dispute and, or, regional group, to a Secretary-General to use his good 
offices to resolve a dispute. Probably the most famous example is the Rainbow Warrior 
Dispute.
81
 Such requests epitomise the confidence which states place in the office of 
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Secretary-General. This authority is distinct to that used by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly under the Charter. How much this authority depends on the individual 
personality of the incumbent or the political climate at the time  open to debate.  
Under Article 100 of the Charter the Secretary-General and the Secretariat ‘in the 
performance of their duties…shall not receive instructions from any Government’. In acting 
at the request of the parties, it is possible the activities fall outside the duties under the 
Charter and, as such, grant more leeway. In acting as Secretary-General (and it is as 
Secretary-General the individual has been solicited and not as a private person) he should 
follow first ‘the principles and purposes of the Charter which are fundamental law and 
accepted and binding on all States.’82 It is difficult to imagine circumstances that would 
permit circumvention of the principles of the Charter. If such activities were in contravention 
of a resolution, it is very possible that the Secretary-General may be transgressing article 100.  
The Cuban Missile Crisis proffers a good example of the use by major powers of Secretary-
General good offices. Reportedly the;  
‘US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisational Affairs credits the 
Secretary-General with serving as a middleman in crucial parts of the dialogue 
between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which assistance led to a 
peaceful solution.’83  
U Thant was on hand to ‘propose a quid pro quo between the Soviet Union and the US for 
simultaneous removal of missiles from Turkey and Cuba.'
84
 Although this never came to pass 
it suggests the faith the superpowers had in the Secretary-General’s impartiality and 
independence as well as his ability to act without a Council or Assembly mandate. The very 
fact it was the two superpowers who had solicited the Secretary-General’s aid further added, 
at this critical juncture, to the legitimacy of parties coming to the Secretary-General 
independent of a UN mandate. 
During the Rainbow Warrior dispute, Javier Pèrez de Cuéller, at the request of France and 
New Zealand, negotiated a settlement between the two States.
85
 This settlement, which 
looked more akin to arbitration than traditional good offices, was a departure, which similar 
to the Annan Plan illustrated the depth of authority given to Secretaries-General. Both parties 
agreed, in advance, to a binding settlement, a significant departure from traditional good 
offices and demonstrates the change that has come about in its operation. 
There are many examples of a Secretary-General embroiling himself in good offices at the 
request of the parties. So far this has not lead to any conflict of interest with resolutions of the 
UN organs, although such conflict is not purely hypothetical. As Trygve Lie stated  
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‘when he agrees with us, governments tend to feel the Secretary-General is within his 
rights and is a good fellow besides; when his views differ from ours he is clearly 
exceeding his authority, his reasoning is bad and even his motives may be suspect.’86  
A Secretary-General must keep his position as an officer of the UN at the forefront of his 
mind if he is not to do damage to both the office of Secretary-General and good offices. So 
far all Secretaries General have succeeded in balancing commitments to resolving conflict 
and to the UN. Their ability to do is largely down to the groundwork set by Dag 
Hammarskjöld during his term in office. 
6. Conclusion 
It was suggested when Javier Pèrez de Cuéller took over as Secretary-General that his 
predecessors had created a ‘dispute settlement role’ whose content may be in opposition to 
most UN members.
87
 More than any other holder of the office of Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld established the dynamism and independence of the dispute settlement role 
identified when Javier Pèrez de Cuéller took office. Dag Hammarskjöld’s impact as 
Secretary-General is evident in the independence of the office, the development of good 
offices beyond a very narrow conception and the expansion of the role of the individual 
international actor. While this paper examined this evolution only in the context of good 
offices, in many ways, this exemplifies the strengths and difficulties associated with the 
office of Secretary-General and just how important Dag Hammarskjöld is to the role. 
The intervention of international actors in conflict has become an accepted attribute of 
conflict resolution and transitions to peace. Yet, as outlined, the exact parameters of action 
for heads of international organisations are far from obvious. The legitimacy of the UN 
Secretary-General’s actions emanate from the Charter and the UN organs, as well as the 
practice emanating from the office. The Secretary-General is as an accepted international 
actor and arbitrator whose involvement does not denote any acceptance of the wider UN 
membership’s political views. Without the advances made by Dag Hammarskjöld it is 
unlikely if the office would have developed to the extent that Secretaries-General are free to 
act independent of both the members and organs of the UN. 
When, as the first Secretary-General Trygve Lie, was sworn into office, the President of the 
General Assembly called upon him to be ‘firm without intransigence … be conciliatory 
without weakness … impartial without exception.’88 Trygve Lie's difficult task of laying the 
groundwork for the office must be given credit, particularly his perseverance in not bowing to 
the pressures members placed upon him. Nonetheless, incontrovertibly it was Dag 
Hammarskjöld, in standing fast in the Congo and during the Peking Hostage situation, who 
firmly established that a Secretary-General was not at the whim of the powerful states or 
members and further, regarding good offices, a Secretary-General works within the principles 
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of the Charter and not the vagaries of politics. Naturally, there are legitimate criticisms of 
Dag Hammarskjöld's specific actions and policies. Nonetheless, his lasting legacy to those 
UN Secretaries-General who followed him is an office which, if used correctly, can be 
independent, authoritative and bring about pacific resolution to conflicts. 
 
